Does wage rigidity really exist? New evidence from US panel data by von Blanckenburg, Korbinian et al.
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
von Blanckenburg, Korbinian; Geist, Alexander; Schmidt, Jörg
Working Paper
Does wage rigidity really exist? New
evidence from US panel data
CAWM discussion paper / Centrum für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung Münster, No. 13
Provided in cooperation with:
Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster (WWU)
Suggested citation: von Blanckenburg, Korbinian; Geist, Alexander; Schmidt, Jörg
(2009) : Does wage rigidity really exist? New evidence from US panel data, CAWM
discussion paper / Centrum für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung Münster, No. 13, http://
hdl.handle.net/10419/51273 
Does wage rigidity really exist? 
















Abstract   Downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) could prevent real wage adjustments 
in times of low inflation rates. Nominal wage rigidity based on annual wages can at least be 
reduced, if the number of working hours is considered. This leads to a lower degree of 
DNWR in hourly wage changes. In this paper, we use a histogram-location approach to 
investigate to what extent annual as well as hourly wages are subject to downward nominal 
wage rigidity. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) we find that 
annual wage changes exhibit a substantially higher level of wage rigidity than hourly wage 
changes which also holds for males compared to females.  
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1.  Introduction 
   Downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) and low inflation rates can prevent 
real wage adjustments which are essential for the efficient functioning of labour 
markets.  Since being established primarily by Tobin (1972), this notion was 
supported by a study of Akerlof et al. (1996), who showed a substantial impact of 
downward nominal wage rigidity on the long-run unemployment rate under close-
to-zero rates of inflation. 
   Sticky wages in the US were subject to several studies with different methods 
based on the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). First evidence in 
analyzing wage rigidity with US micro data was presented by McLaughlin (1994) 
who used a skewness-location approach (SLA), followed by Card and Hyslop 
(1997) using a symmetry approach (SA) and Kahn (1997) using a histogram-
location approach (HLA). These studies provide evidence that downward nominal 
wage rigidity exists in annual wage changes. 
   However, downward nominal wage rigidity could be an artifact. Annual wage 
changes may be sticky in terms of nominal wages, but if firms could alter the 
working hours of their employees, hourly wages could be kept flexible. In this 
context, we assume that firms adjust wages by varying (annual) working hours, 
for example, in order to compass collective agreements. We show that there are 
fundamental differences in micro data regarding annual and hourly wage rigidity. 
For this purpose, we use a formal HLA developed by Kahn (1997) and enhanced 
by Knoppik and Beissinger (2005). Unlike other models, e.g. the SA of Card and 
Hyslop (1997), the normality approach of Borghijs (2001), the SLA of 
McLaughlin (1994) or the earnings-function approach of Altonji and Devereux 
(1999), the HLA is particularly useful to quantify the extent of downward nominal 
wage rigidity and, therefore, allows a comparison of the level of stickiness in 2 
terms of both annual and hourly wages. We especially use data from the PSID to 
ensure comparability of our results to that of previous studies. 
   Moreover, DNWR should also be detected in a gender specific context. Because 
females are supposed to work in different occupations and industries compared to 
males and, also, have a higher degree in wage elasticities (Hall, 1980), wage cuts 
are assumed to be observed more frequently for males than for females. 
Therefore, we will also check if DNWR is higher for males than for females. 
      This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the foundations of the 
histogram location approach are described. In Section 3, the data sources and 
preparation of the data are explained. Section 4 presents the empirical results and 
Section 5 discusses the results. 
 
2   The Model 
      We follow the new histogram location approach of Knoppik and Beissinger 
(2001, 2005). The econometric specification of our model is based on the 
distribution of wage changes taking median centred histograms into account. As 
this approach is well established in economic literature, it is also an appropriate 
instrument for estimating the actual magnitude of downward wage rigidity. 
Therefore, the relative frequencies of wage changes, namely the bins r, are used in 
period t to specify the distribution of wage changes (DWC) 
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where      is the original and time-constant bin size, given flexible wages,     is the 
coefficient of rigidity, which is assumed to represent the nominal wage rigidity, 
that is, a wage change of zero instead of an otherwise observed negative wage 3 
change;     determines the size of the zero bin, which exists even without wage 
rigidity. The exogenous variables    ,  and    ,  are binary, indicating if a bin is 
below zero (   ,  takes the value one) or a zero wage change (   ,  takes the 
value one). Consequently, if both binary variables are zero, wage changes are 
positive. The error term is denoted by  ̂ ,  which is assumed to be i.i.d. with 
  0,  . However, in the following analysis, we focus on the bins which change 
their size over time. These bins are assumed to exist only in the range 
     ,      . 
 
Assumptions 
      For the following analysis, we have to make assumptions about a (virtual) 
distribution of wage changes without rigidity (DWC*) which is essential for 
estimating the level of wage rigidity. Because this distribution displays wage 
changes without any distortions, it covers a greater probability mass below zero. 
In fact, DWC* is unknown, but a comparison of DWC* and DWC enables us to 
estimate the degree of wage rigidity, namely the coefficient    , under the following 
assumptions. 
 
A. Direct relations in nominal wage rigidity: The probability mass of negative 
wage changes in DWC* are assumed to be incurred in the zero bin in the original 
DWC. 
B. Sufficiently large median, e.g. the highest value affected by wage rigidity is 
smaller than the median. 
C. DWC* is time-independent, that is, time variation leads only to positional 
changes in DWC*, but the shape of the distribution remains unchanged. 4 
D. Constant coefficient of wage rigidity: The type and structure of wage rigidity is 
equal for all periods t = 1,…, n. 
E. The wage rigidity parameter     is modelled by a time-invariant parameter. 
 
      Assumptions A and B ensure a close connection of the DWCs. Firstly, this 
means that wage rigidity in the DWC can be immediately traced back to small or 
negative wage changes in the DWC*. Second, the median m is supposed to be 
sufficiently large and, hence, both distributions DWC and DWC* have identical 
medians. They only differ in the size of the zero bins while the number of bins 
below the zero bin remains constant. 
   These properties allow a comparative analysis of the DWCs. We focus on the 
zero bins because they are used as the key objects for estimating the level of wage 
rigidity. Therefore, the deviation of the zero bin in the DWC with respect to the 
zero bin in the DWC* is taken as a quantitative measure for the probability mass 
that usually indicates negative wage changes. It shows the frequency of wage 
changes that are zero instead of being below zero. Thus, it reflects the level of 
wage rigidity. Bins above the zero bin are identical in both distributions and, 
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be zero because the frequency of a “zero wage change” in the original data is 
equal to a “zero wage change” in the DWC*. The values of      reveal the 
estimation results for the bin sizes (below zero) that could be observed in a system 
of flexible wage changes. Concerning negative wage changes, it seems that the 
more the bins differ from the zero bin, the smaller they become. This means that 
the contribution of each bin to the level of wage rigidity also becomes 
continuously smaller. 
 
3   Data 
   Our empirical analysis is based on data of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID). The PSID exists since 1968 and contains annual data of nearly 8.000 U.S. 
families. For our estimation we use income data from the years 1980 to 1997, 
1999 and 2001. The years 1998 and 2000 are not included because in 1997 the 
timing of interviews was changed from a one-year to a two-year survey. In the 
considered period the sample contains 28.133 individuals. We focus on full-time-
employees (FTE) with an employment term of at least one year. Employees of all 
industrial sectors are included. In particular, our analysis concentrates on two core 
variables: Individual labour earnings which report annual earnings and annual 
working hours. The latter variable contains data for the main job as well as for 
extra jobs and includes annual working hours of paid and unpaid overtime. This is 
important because we suppose that firms are able to alter hourly wages by varying 
the number of working hours. Hourly wages are estimated by dividing annual 
wages by annual working hours. The number of observations in the (pooled) 
sample is 114.437 while missing values are removed from the data set. Table 1 
shows some descriptive statistics for age, annual and hourly wages and working 
hours. Table 1  Descriptive statistics of the key variables 
YEAR  AGE  ANNUAL WAGES (US-$)  WORKING HOURS  HOURLY WAGES (US-$) 
  Males  Females  Males  Females  Males Females Males  Females 
1980 36.01  34.43  18429  10308  2345  2098  7.86  4.91 
1981  35.89  34.5  20206 (+9.64%)  11210 (+8.75%)  2337 (-0.34%)  2091 (-0.33%)  8.65 (+10.05%)  5.36 (+9.16%) 
1982  36.15  34.93  22095 (+9.35%)  12468 (+11.22%)  2325 (-0.51%)  2089 (-0.10%)  9.50 (+9.83%)  5.97 (+11.38%) 
1983  36.22  34.99  23356 (+5.71%)  13407 (+7.53%)  2335 (+0.43%)  2109 (+0.96%)  10.00 (+5.26%)  6.36 (+6.53%) 
1984  36.36  35.69  24725 (+5.86%)  14493 (+8.10%)  2326 (-0.39%)  2113 (+0.19%)  10.63 (+6.30%)  6.86 (+7.86%) 
1985  36.43  35.32  26425 (+6.88%)  14954 (+3.18%)  2361 (+1.50%)  2152 (+1.85%)  11.19 (+5.27%)  6.95 (+1.31%) 
1986  36.32  35.57  27126 (+2.65%)  16158 (+8.05%)  2350 (-0.47%)  2154 (+0.09%)  11.54 (+3.13%)  7.50 (+7.91%) 
1987  36.52  35.69  27964 (+3.09%)  16934 (+4.80%)  2365 (+0.64%)  2137 (-0.79%)  11.82 (+2.43%)  7.92 (+5.60%) 
1988  36.92  35.96  29784 (+6.51%)  17795 (+5.08%)  2367 (+0.08%)  2143 (+0.28%)  12.58 (+6.43%)  8.30 (+4.80%) 
1989  37.07  36.15  31004 (+4.10%)  19185 (+7.81%)  2376 (+0.38%)  2160 (+0.79%)  13.05 (+3.74%)  8.88 (+6.99%) 
1990  37.34  36.38  32241 (+3.99%)  20379 (+6.22%)  2381 (+0.21%)  2155 (-0.23%)  13.54 (+3.75%)  9.46 (+6.53%) 
1991  37.99  36.89  33834 (+4.94%)  21100 (+3.54%)  2374 (-0.29%)  2164 (+0.42%)  14.25 (+5.24%)  9.75 (+3.07%) 
1992  38.32  37.56  34943 (+3.28%)  22024 (+4.38%)  2380 (+0.25%)  2177 (+0.60%)  14.68 (+3.02%)  10.12 (+3.79%) 
1993  39.19  37.54  37749 (+8.03%)  23689 (+7.56%)  2367 (-0.55%)  2159 (-0.83%)  15.95 (+8.65%)  10.97 (+8.40%) 
1994  39.26  38.44  40142 (+6.34%)  25233 (+6.52%)  2379 (+0.51%)  2172 (+0.60%)  16.87 (+5.77%)  11.62 (+5.93%) 
1995  39.29  38.53  40394 (+0.63%)  25617 (+1.52%)  2385 (+0.25%)  2164 (-0.37%)  16.94 (+0.41%)  11.84 (+1.89%) 
1996  38.91  38.67  42258 (+4.61%)  26564 (+3.70%)  2400 (+0.63%)  2174 (+0.46%)  17.61 (+3.96%)  12.22 (+3.21%) 
1997  39.69  37.41  42744 (+1.15%)  27773 (+4.55%)  2392 (-0.33%)  2193 (+0.87%)  17.87 (+1.48%)  12.66 (+3.60%) 
1999  39.72  38.99  46087 (+7.82%)  29369 (+5.75%)  2420 (+1.17%)  2209 (+0.73%)  19.04 (+6.55%)  13.30 (+5.06%) 
2001  40.13  39.16 51675  (+12.12%) 32781  (+11.62%)  2399  (-0.87%)  2190 (-0.86%)  21.54 (+13.13%)  14.97 (+12.56%) 
Mean  37.69  36.64  32659 (+5.62%)  20072 (+6.31%)  2368 (+0.12%)  2150 (+0.23%)  13.76 (+5.49%)  9.30 (+6.08%) 
Standard 
Deviation  
1.48  1.55  9192 (+2.96%)  6446 (+2.67%)  26 (+0.62%)  34 (+0.70%)  3.74 (+3.18%)  2.86 (+3.02%) 
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 As can be seen from Table 1, full-time employed females receive substantially 
lower annual wages than full-time employed males. This can partly be explained 
by a lower number of working hours each year for women and/or by lower mean 
hourly wages. Males gain annual wages that are roughly 1.5 times higher than 
those of females. The annual wages of males increase at an average rate of 5.62 
percent p.a. while hourly wages raise at a rate of 5.49 percent p.a. Females, in 
contrast, realize annual wage changes with a higher average rate of 6.31 percent 
and, respectively, hourly wage changes increase with a rate of 6.08 percent. In this 
respect, females’ wages seem constantly to catch up with males’ wages in the 
period 1980 to 2001. 
 
4   Results 
   Figures 2.a and 2.b depict the estimated annual and hourly wage changes in 
1999. Fig. 2.a shows large bin sizes for the zero bin of annual wage changes. In 
addition, the bins are substantially smaller on the left side of the zero bin, as will 
be expected for a symmetrical DWC*. This indicates a certain level of wage 
rigidity in 1999. 
   In Fig. 2.b, hourly wage changes are displayed graphically. The extent of the 
zero bin yields a much lower probability mass and the bins of the DWCs are much 
more symmetrical distributed than in the case of annual wage changes. Therefore, 






Fig. 2   Annual and hourly wage changes in the US, 1999 
 
 
a. Annual Wage Changes   b. Hourly Wage Changes  
 
   Wage inflexibilities could be quantitatively detected in the regression results 
which are given in Table 2 [see also Equation 1]. Therefore, we used a bin width 
of 0.1 percent. For the sake of simplicity, the coefficients of        (refers to the 
first bin below zero) and        (refers to the last bin below zero) are presented, 
rather than displaying any estimated coefficient     . Moreover, we focus on the 
interpretation of     because this coefficient indicates if the probability mass in the 
zero bin is (significantly) different for the DWC and the DWC*. The extent of 
wage rigidity is 0.141 for annual wage changes and 0.051 for hourly wage 
changes. As supposed, the level of wage rigidity is significantly different for 
hourly wage changes compared to annual wage changes. This means that negative 
nominal wage changes are more likely to occur in hourly wages than in annual 
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Table 2   Regression results 
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PSID, 1980-1997, 1999 and 2001. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at 10, 5, 1 % level. 
 
   Furthermore,  wage  adjustments  seem  to be different for males and females. 
Table 3 shows the coefficients of wage rigidity (   ) which are obtained from 
different regression estimates. Firstly, the data reflect the supposed relationship, 
controlling for gender-specific differences. The level of wage rigidity, however, is 
greater in annual wage changes than in hourly wage changes. Males experience 
wage rigidity in annual wage changes to the extent of 0.1966 while females face 
(annual) wage rigidity only to an extent of 0.1056. Concerning hourly data, the 
respective coefficients are 0.0167 for males and 7.01 · 10
-5 for females. Therefore, 
males seem to face higher levels of wage rigidity compared to females.  
Table 3   Rigidity coefficients for males and females. 
      
Annual wage changes (females) 
0.1056* 
(0.062) 




Annual wage changes (males) 
0.1966** 
(0.114) 
Hourly wage changes (males) 
0.0167* 
(0.01) 
PSID, 1980-1997, 1999 and 2001. Standard errors in parentheses; *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at 10, 5, 1 % level. 
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5   Discussion 
      The aim of this analysis was to examine whether downward nominal wage 
rigidity (DNWR) is an artifact. Using data from the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) over the period 1980 to 2001 (without the years 1998 and 2000) 
we conclude that DNWR is lower if hourly wage changes are considered. Rigidity 
in annual wage changes seems to have a substantial amount while rigidity in 
hourly wage changes is much lower. This leads to the assumption that working 
hours are of crucial relevance to avoid nominal wage rigidity. Therefore, if 
working hours are held flexible the economic implications of DNWR on the 
labour market could be tempered. The “degree” of reduction in DNWR could, 
then, be approximately measured by the difference in the coefficients between 
annual and hourly wage rigidity, which is roughly 9 percentage points. Compared 
to an absolute level of wage rigidity in hourly wages of 5.1 percent, the effect of 
working hours is relatively large. In this context, the results indicate that DNWR 
exists to a (relatively) large extent in annual wages and only to a smaller extent in 
hourly wages. Hence, DNWR is not an artifact but the degree seems to be 
different between both wage concepts. 
      In line with Kahn (1997) and Holden / Wulfsberg (2005), we also present 
evidence that DNWR exists within hourly wage changes. However, the degree of 
DNWR differs across these studies and ranges between moderate levels of 
DNWR and a “substantial stickiness of nominal wages” (Kahn, 1997). Even 
though DNWR can be attributed to many factors, such as an increasing foreign 
competition or a declining inflation, it is not clear to what extent the use of 
working hours can help to prevent DNWR. This was emphasized here. 
   Furthermore, we reveal gender-specific differences with respect to the level of 
wage rigidity. To the best of our knowledge, this has not been stressed before. Our 11 
empirical results indicate a considerably higher level of wage rigidity for males 
than for females in annual data. In hourly data, only small degrees of DNWR can 
be detected. Hence, we conclude that from a gender-specific perspective DNWR 
is not an artifact considering annual wage changes. In hourly wage changes, no 
(significant) DNWR can be detected for females but a small degree of DNWR is 
observed for males. Respectively, the calculated difference in the coefficients 
between annual and hourly wage rigidity is about 10.5 percentage points for 
females and about 18.0 percentage points for males. Therefore, the impact of 
working hours is supposed to reduce DNWR more intensively for males. 
Concerning the levels of DNWR, it is not unlikely that DNWR in hourly data 
could be an artifact. 
   The results presented here are not obvious as one could expect that women’s 
labour supply is more elastic than that of men and, therefore, men should more 
often accept wage cuts. In particular, this could potentially be explained by 
gender-specific self-selection in industrial sectors and ocuupations. Since firms in 
specific industrial sectors have different opportunities to vary working hours and 
males and females are not equally distributed across industrial sectors, this could 
lead to different DNWR for males and females. 
   However, this is only one potential source of “gender-specific DNWR”. The 
reasons for lower rigidity in hourly wage changes for females compared to males 
are complex and should be object to future research in more detail. 
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